The claim
“PulseX takes hidden fees, and the PLSX buy-and-burn is fake.”
A recurring claim; no single original source is attributed here.
What the code shows
The 0.29 % fee and its split are in the verified pair code (PulseXFactory.sol:456-459, :365-378). The fee receiver is a buy-and-burn contract that turns its LP tokens into PLSX and burns it; its public burnedPLSX() showed 1,793,575,624,782.03 PLSX on 2026-10-19. Open the v2 factory.
What exactly is claimed?
Two things: that PulseX charges more than it says, and that the advertised buy-and-burn of PLSX does not really happen. Both are reasonable questions for any exchange — fee logic can be buried in code, and “burn” announcements are sometimes marketing. Both can be checked.
Are the fees in the code?
Yes. Every pair enforces the 0.29 % swap fee in its invariant check balance × 10000 − amountIn × 29 (PulseXFactory.sol:456-459). In v2 pools, 7/29 of the fee growth — 0.07 % of volume — is minted to the protocol’s fee receiver feeTo and 0.22 % stays with liquidity providers (:365-378). Another addition is an extra senderOrigin field written into the Mint and Burn events for analytics, with no effect on money (:246-247). A full line-by-line comparison with Uniswap v2 has not been made.
Is the burn real?
Yes. feeTo is a buy-and-burn contract. It redeems the LP tokens it receives, swaps the tokens towards PLSX and calls PLSX.burn (PLSXBuyAndBurnUpgradeable.sol:192-265). The running total is public: burnedPLSX() returns starting supply minus current supply (:90-93).
| Reading on 2026-10-19 (block 27,837,219) | Value |
|---|---|
| PLSX starting supply | 143,116,599,865,548.70 |
| PLSX total supply | 141,323,024,240,766.67 |
| Burned | 1,793,575,624,782.03 (about 1.25 %) |
Because the PLSX contract can no longer mint (PLSX can be minted?), the falling supply can only come from burns.
What should be disclosed — and rarely is?
| Detail | Fact on 2026-10-17 | Code |
|---|---|---|
| Developer cut | 14.29 % of the bought PLSX goes to a developer address instead of being burned — about 0.01 % of v2 trade volume | :253-257 |
| Who can change it | the burn contract’s owner, a single key, can raise the cut up to 50 % and upgrade the contract; the developer address can also be changed by itself | :111-116, :123-129, :302 |
| Stopping the burn | setting the caller bounty to 0 would stop burning without an upgrade, while the developer cut would still be paid | :258-263 |
| Who triggers conversions | only whitelisted addresses (anyAuth = false), not anyone |
:192-196 |
| v1 pools | the burn receives the entire fee growth, not 7/29 — verified on-chain; v1 liquidity providers earn no fee income | v1 :376 |
None of these is hidden — all are readable in the verified code and on-chain — but they change the picture of “fees burn PLSX”: less than all of the protocol fee is burned, the split depends on one key, and in v1 pools the protocol takes more than in v2. No official statement has been found on whether the v1 behaviour was intended. Full detail: PulseX fees.
Verdict
False for the burn; partly accurate for the fees. The PLSX burn is real and measurable, and every fee is in the verified code. But the v1 fee split differs from its own code comment — the protocol takes the whole fee growth and v1 liquidity providers earn no fee income — and part of the bought PLSX goes to a developer address under single-key control.